The agreement has of course not healed all of the wounds that continue to embitter relations between citizens and their state.

But by bringing political rivals together in the service of the larger public interest, the agreement has done something that not too long ago seemed almost impossible: breathing life into the possibility of constitutional democracy in Zimbabwe.

The constitution drafting committee now has a chance to transform this possibility into reality.

But in order to fulfil its enormous responsibility, the 25-member parliamentary committee appointed by Speaker Lovemore Moyo must do more than simply adopt the conventional menu of western liberal democratic constitutional arrangements governing the allocation of powers and the protection of civil and political rights in Zimbabwe.

These boilerplate constitutional provisions are neither appropriate nor sufficient to establish constitutional democracy in Zimbabwe.

The constitution drafting committee must instead depart from the traditional western model of constitutional democracy and deploy innovative constitutional design strategies to finally bring democratic peace to the nation and its people.

Most western democracies are either presidential or parliamentary systems.

The former, like the United States, typically have a separately elected presidency and legislature that operate independently of the other, with both enjoying autonomy in their respective spheres of jurisdiction.

The latter, like the United Kingdom, usually have a prime minister and a legislature that are interdependent, with the prime minister relying on the legislature both for his appointment and to pass his legislative program and the legislature in turn being subject to the leadership of the prime minister.

Like France, Zimbabwecurrently has a semi-presidential system, in which an elected president must cohabit alongside an appointed prime minister in an often tumultuous and always vigorous battle for the support of the legislature.

But even still, the president may act unilaterally in his area of authority just as the prime minister possesses plenary power on matters under his exclusive control.

As the constitution drafting committee embarks on the grand project of designing the new Zimbabwean constitution, it should reject all three models.

Neither presidentialism, nor parliamentarism, nor semi-presidentialism is an advisable constitutional structure for the new Zimbabwe.

Why? All three systems share a feature in common: in each, there is a single individual whose powers trump those of all others and therefore allow him to take action on foreign or domestic affairs, or both, unilaterally.

For a state emerging optimistically yet cautiously from decades of autocracy, the prospect of entrenching the power of unilateral action in the hands of a single individual is a recipe for disaster.

In the place of these customary presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, Zimbabwewould be better served by adopting a consociationalist model of constitutional government.

Consociationalism divides the constitutional powers of government among competing groups in a fragmented society, all in a noble effort to quell disunity and work toward a peaceful resolution of political and social disagreements.

This model of government has in the past been successful in many states, namely Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and on a smaller scale in Canada.

Today in Iraq, consociationalism is showing just how effective it can be to bring peace to once-divided peoples.

Consider the Presidency Council in Iraq. The executive authority of Iraqis vested in this three-person group, consisting of the president of Iraqand two vice-presidents.

The Presidency Council performs weighty functions, including managing the affairs of the state, exercising the reserve power of veto over parliamentary legislation, serving as commander-in-chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces, overseeing judicial nominations, naming the prime minister and also retaining the power to dismiss the prime minister and the Council of Ministers.

But here is the rub: in performing these substantial duties, the Presidency Council must make its decisions unanimously.

The virtue of the Presidency Council is that it joins various competing parties together within the executive branch of government.

It is a form of forced collaboration. Iraqbeing home to three major ethnic groups has long endured ethnic tensions.

But the Presidency Council helps to palliate this friction by bringing uniting the three ethnic groups in one station.

The inaugural Presidency Council joined Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, as president, with Adel Abdul Mahdi, a Shi’ite, and Ghazi al-Yawar, a Sunni, as the two vice-presidents.

The second Presidency Council was installed after the ratification of the new Iraqi Constitution: Talabani, a Kurd, remained president, Abdul Mahdi was retained as a deputy and the Shi’ite representative, and Tariq Al-Hashimi came aboard as the second deputy and the Sunni representative.

Rather than allowing one of the three ethnic groups to possess the full powers of the presidency, the innovation of the Presidency Council gives each of those three groups a representative on the Council.

And given that the Presidency Council must make its decisions unanimously, it also gives each of those three groups a voice and a veto in setting the direction of the state.

The Presidency Council reflects one of the focal tenets of consociationalism, which is to compel the cooperation of elites.

The hope driving Iraq’s creation of the Presidency Council is that this institutionalised cooperation will filter throughout the entire government apparatus and will also, more importantly, permeate into the popular political culture.

In this respect, the Presidency Council is more than an exercise in creative constitutionalism.

It is a part of a broader and carefully tailored effort to forge a national identity and a collective sense of community among Iraqis, who have long been dispossessed of the conviction that democracy is a shared venture founded on faith in collaboration, compromise and mutual respect.

The Presidency council holds promise for inspiring and instilling a constitutional culture that respects the rule of law, rejects divisive political posturing and partisan manoeuvring, and embraces stability in the service of the larger interests of the state and its people.

The Zimbabwean constitution drafting committee should not necessarily adopt the Presidency Council without fully evaluating its consequences.

But the committee should consider the Council among many creative constitutional structures that may help guide Zimbabwethrough the next decade of democratic development and reconciliation between President Mugabe and Prime Minister Tsvangirai.

Perhaps the committee might recommend the creation of an inaugural two-member Presidency Council consisting of Co-Presidents Mugabe and Tsvangirai.

Perhaps the committee might also recommend that Zimbabweadopt this Presidency Council only temporarily, say for one or two presidential terms, at which point the Council would dissolve and revert to a single president.

A temporary Presidency Council is precisely the course that Iraqhas chosen.

Whatever the committee ultimately decides, its members must keep in mind their constituents: Zimbabwean citizens yearning for nothing more than a stable nation in which to raise their children, lead their lives, and find fulfilment.

If consociationalism can be helpful in smoothing the terrain on which public policy is developed—from health care, to economic development, to judicial reform—then the committee has a moral duty to give it serious consideration.

But let us be clear about one thing: consociationalism is not, on its own, a complete prescription for peace in Zimbabwe.

The actual process by which the new constitution will be designed must be open, transparent and attentive to the values of inclusion and popular participation, not unlike the recent Kenyan constitutional drafting process.

There must also be something akin to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission to expose, but not necessarily to prosecute, the crimes perpetrated in years past.

For if the constitutional drafting committee is to bring peace and democracy to Zimbabwe, it must look beyond the traditional examples of western constitutionalism that are no doubt being suggested as models.

Instead, the committee must create a constitution that is at once uniquely its own, responsive to the challenges of the current political landscape, and reflective of the aspirations and ambitions of all Zimbabweans.

Richard Albert is president of the Canadian Council for Democracy.

Email him at richard.albert@ccd-ccd.com.